

Message Text

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AMCONSUL KIEV POUCH
AMCONSUL KRAKOW POUCH
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD POUCH
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL MUNICH POUCH
AMCONSUL POZNAN POUCH
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 WARSAW 0888

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PL US
SUBJ: L'ENVOI

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. IN A SERIES OF MESSAGES SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS (NOT ALL OF WHICH WERE SENT TO THE INFORMATION ADDRESSEES), THE EMBASSY HAS TRIED TO PROVIDE A CURRENT PICTURE OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS IN THIS TROUBLED COUNTRY. AS I LEAVE WARSAW, I AM TRANSMITTING IN THIS MESSAGE SOME PERCEPTIONS WHICH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN MADE EVIDENT IN THAT EARLIER SERIES. BRIEFLY, THE BURDEN IS THIS. WE MUST NOW BE TOUGHER IN ANSWER TO POLAND'S PLEAS
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FOR FINANCIAL HELP, BECAUSE THE POLISH LEADERSHIP SHOWS A FUNDAMENTAL INABILITY TO ENFORCE UPON ITSELF THE DISCIPLINE THAT IS NECESSARY IF WE ARE NOT TO CONFRONT ONE REQUEST FOR ROLLOVER AFTER ANOTHER. AT THE SAME TIME, THIS LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN TRYING, WITH SOME SUCCESS, TO OPEN POLAND TO THE WEST MORE THAN HAD BEEN POSSIBLE BEFORE 1971, AND HAS BEEN DOING SO WITH THE TOLERATION OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. IN

LOOKING AT POLAND AND FORMULATING OUR POLICY TOWARDS IT, WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO FRUSTRATE THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT, GRADUAL AND SLIGHT THOUGH IT MAY NOW BE. THE GAME IS A DELICATE ONE FOR ALL CONCERNED, AND FOR NONE MORE THAN GIEREK & CO. BUT, IF THE OPENING TO THE WEST WERE CLOSED, THE REAL LOSERS WOULD BE 32 MILLION POLES, WHO ARE SPIRITUALLY, CULTURALLY, AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY WESTERN IN THEIR OUTLOOK AND HOPES -- PLUS A GOODLY PERCENTAGE OF THE OTHER 2 MILLION POLES, THOSE "RADISHES" WHO BELONG TO THE UNITED POLISH WORKERS' PARTY. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

2. AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, AS I BEGAN TO THINK ABOUT LEAVING THIS POST, I IMAGINED THAT I WAS GOING TO WRITE A SORT OF DEFINITIVE ANALYSIS OF TODAY'S POLAND, WHAT IS WRONG WITH IT, WHERE IT IS GOING, AND WHERE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND ITS MISSION HERE FIT INTO THAT PICTURE. AS WITH NEARLY ALL SUCH NEW YEAR'S RESOLUTIONS, THIS ONE, TOO, WILL BE HONORED PRIMARILY IN THE BREACH, SINCE I NOW HAVE LESS THAN 48 HOURS TO SPEND HERE AND THERE ARE STILL A NUMBER OF OTHER THINGS I MUST DO. I WANT, NEVERTHELESS, TO PUT DOWN A FEW WORDS WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO PEOPLE IN THE DEPARTMENT AND ELSEWHERE WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH US-POLISH RELATIONS.

3. TWO TOURS OF DUTY IN POLAND, TALLING SOMETHING OVER
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SEVEN AND ONE-HALF YEARS, HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO BE OBJECTIVE ABOUT THIS COUNTRY AND ITS PEOPLE. WHEN I LEFT POLAND IN 1949, FOLLOWING THE FIRST TOUR, I FELT STRONGLY THAT PEOPLE IN THE WEST, INCLUDING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, HAD A LARGE, UNDISCHARGED OBLIGATION TO CONTEMPORARY POLES, WHO, WILLY-NILLY, HAD BEEN THE FIRST NATION TO FEEL THE BRUNT OF THE ARMED MIGHT OF NAZISM (AS, IN 1919-20, THEY HAD BEEN FIRST TO FEEL THE BLOWS OF BOLSHEVISM). I FEEL THAT WAY EVEN MORE STRONGLY TODAY. CLEARLY, SENTIMENTS OF THIS SORT ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR POLICY, LET ALONE WISE POLICY, BUT I THINK I SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THIS ONE BEFORE I WRITE ABOUT THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH POLAND TODAY.

4. THE DOMESTIC SITUATION. (A) GENERAL. POLAND IS IN A BAD WAY TODAY AND THE SITUATION WILL GET WORSE BEFORE IT GETS BETTER. ON JANUARY 31, IT BEGAN TO SNOW; WE HAVE HAD ABOUT THREE INCHES SO FAR. BUT THE SNOW IS TWO MONTHS TOO LATE. SINCE THE WINTER WHEAT WAS PUT INTO THE GROUND, WE HAVE HAD RECURRENT FROSTS AND THAWS; NOT TOO MUCH CAN BE EXPECTED OF THE WINTER CROP, I FEAR. PERHAPS, AT ANY RATE, POLAND'S GROUND WATER WILL BE REPLENISHED FOR THE SPRING AND SUMMER GROWING SEASONS.

WHEN SECRETARY KREPS SAW JAROSEWICZ, I WAS SON INDELICATE AS
TO MENTION THE BIBLICAL SEVEN LEAN YEARS, TO WHICH THE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 6 WARSAW 0888

EXDIS

PREMIER RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE POLES WERE A
CATHOLIC PEOPLE AND THE GOOD LORD WOULD NOT PUNISH THEM WITH
SEVEN LEAN YEARS. THE PROSPECTS NOW ARE FOR A FIFTH LEAN
YEAR, HOWEVER. EVERYTHING TO DO WITH THIS COUNTRY MUST
BEGIN WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE FOOD PROBLEM. THE POLISH
PROVERB IS RIGHT: "WHEN THE POLE IS HUNGARY, HE IS ANGRY."
(B) "SOCIALISM". IT IS RIGHT TO PUT THE WORD IN QUOTATION
MARKS, BECAUSE THE CENTRAL THING TO BE SIAD ABOUT THE CONCEPT
IS THAT IT PROFOUNDLY AMBIGUOUS. EVERYBODY HAS A DIFFERENT
UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IT MEANS OR SHOULD MEAN. WHATEVER THE
PRECISE MANING, HOWEVER, THE PRACTISE IN POLAND HAS BEEN
AND IS PERNICIOUS. "SOCIALISM" HAS NOT YET COMPLETELY
DESTROYED THE SENSE OF INITIATIVE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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AMONG POLES ONLY BECAUSE, FIRST, HUMAN NATURE MAY, INDEED, BE EXPELLED WITH A PITCHFORK, BUT WILL ALWAYS CREEP BACK IN, AND, SECOND, AS A NATION, THE POLES ARE EXTREMELY STUBBORN -- THE TRAIT WHICH, ON THE ONE HAND, ACVUNTS FOR THE FACT THAT THEY ARE STILL HERE, AFTER THE YEARS OF PARTITION AND IMMOLATION, AND, ON THE OTHER, IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH SELF-INFLICTED STUPIDITIES AS THE DIASTROUS JUNE, 1976, DECISION TO RAISE PRICES. BUT GREAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARDS DESTROYING ALL INITIATIVE. EVERYTHING IN THE ECONOMY OPERATES ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE IS, TOO, SUCH A THING AS A FREE LUNCH. MOST HOUSING OS HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED; HENCE THE CHRONIC SHORTAGE OF HOUSING AND FIVE-TO-TEN-YEAR WAITS FOR NEW APARTMENTS. FOOD IS HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED; HENCE LONG LINES IN FRONT OF THE FOOD STORES. MEAT IS THE MOST HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED OF FOODS; HENCE THE LONGEST LINES ARE IN FRONT OF THE MEAT STORES. NOBODY KNOWS WHAT ANY-THING REALLY COSTS, ALTHOUGH EVERYBODY KNOWS VERY WELL THAT ANY GIVEN ITEM IS EITHER TOO EXPENSIVER (OR SIMPLY UNAVAILABLE) OR TOO CHEAP (AND SIMPLY UNAVAILABLE). THE WORST THING, THOUGH, ABOUT "SOCIALISM" IS THAT THE BUCK STOPS NOWHERE. IN WESTERN SOCIEITIES, PEOPLE THINK THEY KNOW WHO IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE, WHETHER IT BE THE PRESIDENT , THE PRIME MINISTER, OR THE PARLIAMENT. (IN FACT, OF COURSE, NONE OF THESE OFFICIALS OR INSTITUTIONS HAS MADE PEOPLE UNDERSTAND ITS LIMITATIONS AND INABILITY TO SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS; THUS, IN THE WEST, WHETHER WE USE THE WORD "SOCIALISM" OR NOT, WE START SLOWLY DOWN THE PATH WHICH THE POLES AND THEIR FELLOW EASTERN EUROPEANS HAVE, UNDER EXPERT SOVIET TUTELAGE, SO SPEEDILY TRAVERSED IN A MERE 30-ODD YEARS.) AND, IN THE WEST, THE INSTITUTION, WHETHER THE PRESIDENCY, THE CABINET, OR THE PARLIAMENT, USUALLY AGREES WITH THE PEOPLE AND IS PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE

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THAT, ULTIMATELY, IS INDEED RESPONSIBLE. IN POLAND, THE SAME SURFACE PICTURE IS TO BE SEEN. PEOPLE THINK THAT THE FIRST SECRETARY IS RESPONSIBLE. UNLIKE MOST WESTERN CHEIF EXECUTIVES, HOWEVER, THE FIRST SECRETARY HAS A THEOTRY BEHIND WHICH TO SHELTER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH RESPONSIBILITY IS DIVIDED AMONG SEVERAL INSTANCES. BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE FIRST SECRETARY'S OWN PERCEPTION DIFFERS FROM THAT OF THIS WESTERN OPPOSITE NUMBERS. HE DOES NOT FEEL HIMSELF RESPONSIBLE, SINCE THE PENALTY FOR FAILURE -- DISMISSAL -- IS NOT INEVTIABLE AND PALPABLE. THUS, A MIS-TAKE LIKE THAT OF JUNE, 1976, (WORSE THAN A MISTAKE, IT WAS

A CRIME), IS NOT FOLLOWED BY THE DISMISSAL OF ANY SENIOR OFFICIAL OF THE POLISH COMMUNIST ESTABLISHMENT. HERE IS THE POLITICAL FREE LUNCH WHICH GIVES THE LIE TO WESTERN STREET WISDOM. THE WORST THAT CAN BEFALL GIEREK IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS IS THE KIND OF OBLIVION IN WHICH GOMULKA NOW LIVES OVER IN PRAGA (THE WARSAW SUBURB ON THE EASTERN BANK OF THE VISTULA.) (OF COURSE, IN THE MOST EXTREME POLITICAL SCENARIO IMAGINABLE HERE, THE MOB BURNS DOWN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUILDING (CF. BUDAPEST, 1956) AND THE FIRST SECRETARY HAS BEEN SO STUBBORN OR DILATORY THAT HE SUFFOCATES; BUT THAT IS NOT A LIKELY OUTCOME IN POLAND.) ULTIMATELY, THEN, THE FIRST SECRETARY'S

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EXDIS

PSYCHOLOGY TAKES ON SOME RESEMBLANCE TO THAT OF ALFRED E. NEWMAN ("WHAT, ME WORRY?"). SUCH AN ATTITUDE CAN DEVELOP ONLY ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE POPULATION IN THESE COUNTRIES. ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, GIEREK HAS TOLD PROMINENT AMERICAN VISITORS,

"OUR FIRM IS A RELIABLE ONE; WE ARE A SOLID PARTNER," JUST AS
THOUGH HE WERE THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF POLSKA, SP. S O.PP.
(POLAND, LTD.). THE IMPLICATION IS THAT, IF THE PEOPLE DON'T
LIKE THE POLICIES, WHICH THE LEADERSHIP ONLY IMPOSES ON THEM FOR
THEIR OWN GOOD, THEY CAN DAMNED WELL GET THEMSELVES ANOTHER
MANAGING DIRECTOR, WHILE THE FIRST SECRETARY RETIRES TO HIS HOUSE
IN KATOWICE (ACTUALLY, ZABRZE) AS A PENSIONER OF THE PZPR CENTRAL
COMMITTEE (A LA GOMULKA IN PRAGA). SOONER OR LATER, OF COURSE,
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SOMEBODY HAS TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY, JUST AS SOMEBODY HAS TO
PAY FOR "SOCIALISM", BUT THE COMMON ATTITUDE IIN THE ESTABLISH-
MENT HERE IS THAT, BY THE DAY OF RECKONING, IT WILL BE SOMEBODY
ELSE, NOT THE PRESENT INCUMBENT. AMONG THE GREAT MASS OF THE
POPULATION, THERE IS A HALF-CYNACAL, HALF-INNOCENT ATTITUDE
TOWARDS "SOCIALISM," BEST SUMMED UP IN THE DISCUSSION I HAD WITH
THE GREAT SOCIOLOGIST, JAN SZCZEPANSKI, ABOUT THE UTOPIAN PLAN
FOR REFORM OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM PROPOSED BY A COMMITTEE HE
HEADED. WHEN I OBJECTED THAT IT WOULD COST A FANTASTIC AMOUNT OF
MONDY, SZCZEPANSKI SAID THE POLITBIURO HAD NEVERTHELESS DECIDED
TO GO AHEAD WITH MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL, SINCE IT WAS SO
IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE BEST EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM POSSIBLE. "AFTER
ALL," HE SAID, "THAT'S WHY THE GOOD LORD GAVE US SOCIALISM." BUT
THE GOOD LORD NOT ONLY GIVETH; HE ALSO TAKETH AWAY. SO, "SOCIAL-
ISM" CANNOT INDEFINITELY BE A PROCESS OF ONLY GETTING, AND NOT
PRODUCING.

(C) THE LEADERSHIP. FINALLY, WHILE GIEREK IS THE REGIME'S FRONT
MAN AND PRIMUS INTER PARES, HE IS NOT A ONE-MAN BAND. THERE IS A
COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HE IS NOT PREDOMINANT WITHIN IT. HE
NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF OTHER POLITBIURO MEMBERS BEFORE HE CAN MOVE.
JAROSZEWICZ'S RETIREMENT, ELEVATION TO CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COUNCIL
OF STATE, OR OTHER MODE OF DEPARTURE FROM THE PREMIERSHIP HAS
BEEN RUMORED EVER SINCE I ARRIVED IN POLAND. SO FAR, HE JUST
KEEPS ROLLING ALONG. NOT ONLY DO THE "FRIENDS" (I.E., SOVIETS)
INSIST UPON HIS RETENTION; HE IS ALSO INDISPENSABLE TO HIS POLISH
COLLEAGUES FOR HIS ABILITY TO TRANSLATE TO THE "FRIENDS" THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE "POLISH SPECIFIC". STEFAN OLSZOWSKI IS THE
MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE TO REPLACE GIEREK SOME DAY, PROVIDED ALL
THINGS REMAIN EQUAL (ALWAYS A QUESTIONABLE PROPOSITION BETWEEN
BUG AND ODER). RYSZARD FRELEK WOULD BE MY SECOND CHOICE FOR THIS
HONOR, IF HE IS ABLE TO STAY OFF THE SAUCE. HENRYK JABLONSKI
WOULD LIKE TO GET BACK TO ACADEMIA, BUT, SO FAR, REMAINS NECESSARY
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AS EX-PPS (POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY) WINDOW DRESSING. TEJCHMA HAS

BEEN REMOVED AS MINISTER OF CULTURE AND WILL EVENTUALLY BE SENT ABROAD AS AMBASSADOR. THE POST OF MINISTER OF CULTURE WILL NOT BE FILLED FOR SOME TIME, BECAUSE THE LEADERSHIP CANNOT AGREE ON A CANDIDATE. I TAKE THIS TO MEAN THAT THE "HARDS" AND THE "SOFTS" ARE SO FINELY BALANCED ON THIS ISSUE THAT THEY CAN'T BREAK THE DEADLOCK. (IT IS GOOD NOT TO BE MISLED BY USE OF THE TERM "HARD-LINER," WHICH, IN TOLAND, MEANS SOMEBODY WHO, IN THE SOVIET, CZECHOSLOVAK, BULGARIAN, ROMANIAN, OR EAST GERMAN POLIT-BIURO WOULD BE REGARDED AS NO BOLSHEVIK AT ALL, BUT RATHER AS SOMETHING BETWEEN A CIA AGENT (SOVIET) AND A DANGEROUS REVISIONIST (EAST GERMAN). SO VICE MINISTER WILHELMI WILL RULE THAT ROOST FOR THE NEXT THREE-TO-SIX MONTHS. KAZIMIERZ BARCIKOWSKI HAS BEEN DEMOTED TO PARTY FIRST SECRETARY IN KRAKOW AND WILL PRESUMABLY NOT BE COMING BACK TO "THE CENTER."

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EXDIS

HIS NERVES WERE SHOT. (BEING MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE IN POLAND IS ALMOST AS RISKY AS BEING A PARTY HISTORIAN IN THE USSR.) BUT HE WILL PRESUMABLY BE KEPT ON AS A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLIT-BIURO UNTIL THE MEMBERS CAN AGREE ON A REPLACEMENT, JUST AS, BY

THE SAME FORCE OF INERTIA, TEJCHMA WILL PRESUMABLY REMAIN A FULL MEMBER FOR A TIME. IN MY VIEW, THE REST OF THE GANG ARE MORE OR LESS FACELESS APPARATCHIKI. IF THEIR NAMES WEREN'T BABIUCH, JAGIELSKI, AND KRUCZEK, THEY WOULD BE ANTECKI, KWIATEK, AND WROBEL, OR SOMETHING ELSE STILL, AND NOBODY WOULD BE MUCH BETTER OR WORSE OF AS A RESULT. THERE ARE MANY HONEST, CONSCIENTIOUS, INTELLIGENT, AND CAPABLE MEN IN THE POLISH LEADERSHIP. WE CAN START WITH GIEREK, WHO IS ALL OF THOSE THINGS, BUT, UNFORTUNATELY FOR POLAND, IS ALSO A LOYAL TEAM-PLAYER ON A TEAM CALLED "THE PZPR." CONFIDENTIAL

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JAN SZCZEPANSKI, HENRYK KISIEL, MARIAN KRZAK, ROMUALD SPASOWSKI, ROMUALD PIETRASZEK, JERZY OLSZEWSKI, WLODZIMIERZ WISNIEWSKI -- ONE COULD GO ON AND ON. BUT THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH OF THESE MEN WHERE IT COUNTS, IN THE POLITBIURO. MAN FOR MAN, THE POLISH EPISCOPATE HAS TWICE THE TALENT, INITIATIVE, IMAGINATION, AND VERVE, AND A GREAT DEAL MORE COURAGE. NO WONDER, THEN, THAT IDEALISTIC YOUNG POLES GO INTO THE CHURCH, RATHER THAN INTO THE PARTY APPARATUS. AS RYSZARD FRELEK ONCE SAID TO ME BITTERLY ABOUT THE CHURCH'S SEMINARIANS, "WE SHOULD HAVE THEM."

5. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. (A) CURSED BY GEOGRAPHY. OCCASIONALLY, UNFAVORABLE COMPARISONS ARE DRAWN BETWEEN POLAND'S FAITHFUL FOLLOWING OF THE SOVIET LINE IN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE INDEPENDENCE THAT ROMANIA HAS SHOWN. SUCH COMPARISONS FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CENTRAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RELATIONSHIPS OF EACH COUNTRY WITH THE USSR. POLAND LIES ATHWART THE SOVIET LINES OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE ZONE OF OCCUPATION IN EASTERN GERMANY, AND THE LOSS OF POLAND BY THE USSR WOULD INEVITABLY BRING WITH IT A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF MOSCOW WITH GERMANY. ROMANIA, ON THE OTHER HAND, LIES ATHWART NO VITAL LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS (ALTHOUGH AN END OF THE STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS RENDERED EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN IT WOULD OTHERWISE BE BY ROMANIAN "INDEPENDENCE"). UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE USSR COULD HAVE ACCESS TO BULGARIA BY THE BLACK SEA AND THERE ARE COMMON BOUNDARIES WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY. POLAND, HOWEVER, IS THE KEYSTONE OF THE CORDON STALINAIRE AND IT IS VERY HARD TO IMAGINE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP PERMITTING IT TO CUST ITSELF LOOSE FROM SOVIET FOREIGN-POLICY DIRECTION. (B) ON THE OTHER HAND ... THE OPENING TO THE WEST, WHICH HAS BEEN PURSUED BY GIEREK SINCE 1971, IS DEPENDENT UPON THE CONTINUATION OF DETENTE -- SO THE POLISH LEADERS TELL US, AND THERE IS NO REASON TO DOUBT THEM. SO LONG AS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONSIDERS THAT ITS MONOPOLY OF POLITICAL POWER WITHIN CONFIDENTIAL

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THE USSR AND ITS STRATEGIC CONTROL OF THE WARSAW PACT AREA ARE NOT SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED BY THE WEST, DETENTE CAN CONTINUE. WHAT IS MORE, AND OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE (ALTHOUGH SO FAR ONLY A FEW WESTERN OBSERVERS SEEM TO RECOGNIZE JUST HOW IMPORTANT IT IS, E.G., PAUL MARER, A. ROSS JOHNSON), THE SOVIET EMPIRE IS INCREASINGLY BECOMING AN EXPENSIVE PROPOSITION FOR THE METROPOLE. LIKE THE BRITISH IN INDIA IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THIS CENTURY, THE SOVIETS HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT YOU HAVE TO PAY A PRICE TO KEEP PEOPLE IN SUBJECTION (AND EVEN THEN THE WRETCHES DON'T SHOW YOU ANY GRATITUDE*). SINCE THE NUMBER-ONE SOVIET FOREIGN-POLICY PRIORITY IS MAINTENANCE OF THE CLAIM THAT THE USSR IS MILITARILY AT PARITY WITH THE U.S., AND IT COSTS A LOT OF MONEY TO KEEP UP WITH THOSE PARTICULAR JONESES, A QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCING ARISES.

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EXDIS

EVEN SO, THE BLESSING GIVEN TO GIEREK & CO. ("ENRICHISSEZ-VOUS AVEC LES MOYENS DES BANQUES CAPITALISTES") DID NOT RELIEVE THE IMPERIUM OF THE NEED OF COMING UP WITH THE EQUIVALENT OF A BILLION-RUBLE CREDIT FOLLOWING THE JUNE, 1976, BLUNDER. AND, OF

COURSE, MOSCOW WILL PAY WHAT IT MUST TO ENSURE AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SITUATION IN WHICH SOVIET TROOPS ULTIMATELY MIGHT BE COMPELLED TO SHOOT POLES. (ULTIMATELY, THEY WOULD DO IT, BUT ANY ALTERNATIVE IS PREFERABLE.) THE POLISH LEADERSHIP IS THUS NOT WITHOUT ITS OWN RESOURCES IN THIS RELATIONSHIP, EVEN IF THEY ARISE ONLY FROM WEAKNESS. POLAND IS ABLE TO PURSUE AS ACTIVE A DIPLOMACY AS THE ROMANIANS, NOT EVERY AMANATION OF WHICH SERVES ONLY SOVIET FOREIGN-POLICY GOALS. BUT, OF COURSE, POLISH DIPLOMATS AND COMMENTATORS CANNOT SAY THIS OUT LOUD WHERE
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THE "FRIENDS" WILL HAVE TO TAKE PUBLIC NOTICE OF IT. IF ONE COMPARES THE SITUATION IN 1970 WITH THAT TODAY, THE CONTRAST IS STRIKING. IN 1970, THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION AMONG WESTERN STUDENTS OF POLAND ABOUT WHETHER THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD PERMIT THE POLISH LEADERSHIP TO CONCLUDE A TREATY WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. THIS WAS FINALLY PERMITTED ONLY AFTER MOSCOW HAD SIGNED ITS TREATY FIRST. TODAY, HOWEVER, WHILE BREZHNEV FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO SET A DATE TO VISIT SCHMIDT, THE CHANCELLOR COMES TO POLAND FOR A MOST SUCCESSFUL MEETING WITH GIEREK AND A VERY IMPRESSIVE TOUR. I CAN'T HELP BEING REMINDED, TOO, THAT, IN THE EARLY POST-1945 YEARS, THE POLISH SOCIALIST PARTY ATTEMPTED (VAINLY, OF COURSE) TO STAVE OFF ABSORPTION BY THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY AND JUSTIFY ITS CLAIM TO CONTINUED SEPARATE EXISTENCE BY CONTENDING THAT IT WAS PECULIARLY FITTED TO INTERPRET SOVIET-STYLE "SOCIALISM" TO WESTERN EUROPEANS, AND PARTICULARLY WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS. TO SOME EXTENT AND WITH UNDERSTANDABLE WARINESS, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP APPEARS PREPARED NOW TO PERMIT THE POLES TO DO A LITTLE SUCH INTERPRETING. HENCE THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF THE PZPR AND THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. (C) AFTER BREZHNEV, WHO (OR WHAT)? WHEN LEONID ILYICH SNEEZES, THE POLISH POLITBIURO GETS PNEUMONIA. THERE IS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GIEREK AND BREZHNEV, WHO SERVED AS POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE GROUP OF ARMIES WHICH LIBERATED SOUTHERN POLAND IN 1944-45 AND ON WHOSE AFFINITY WITH THAT PART OF THE COUNTRY AND DREAMS OF MILITARY GLORY GIEREK PLAYS AS BEST HE CAN. IT DOES SEEM TO BE A FACT THAT GIEREK HAS BEEN ABLE TO GET THINGS OUT OF THIS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH MIGHT HAVE PROVEN IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT ITS EXISTENCE. SO THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL SUCCEED BREZHNEV IS A SERIOUS ONE FOR THE POLES. I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THEY SEE NO ONE ON THE SOVIET POLITICAL HORIZON WHOSE LOOKS THEY LIKE NEARLY SO WELL AS THOSE OF L.I. BREZHNEV. HIM THEY QUITE SINCERELY WISH "STO LAT" (I.E., "MAY YOU LIVE A
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HUNDRED YEARS"), WHILE KEEPING THEIR FINGERS CROSSED.

6. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. (A) THE CHARM OF THE POLISH PROLETARIAT. GIEREK OPERATES ON THE BASIS OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS: WITH BREZHNEV, WITH SCHMIDT, WITH GISCARD (THEY HAVE A COMMON TONGUE, FRENCH), WITH KREISKY, AND WITH THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT. HIS WESTERN EXPOSURE HAS GIVEN HIM A KNOWLEDGE OF THE WEST AND ITS WAYS POSSESSED BY NO OTHER WARSAW PACT LEADER. HIS EFFECTIVENESS IN HIS CONTACTS WITH WESTERN LEADERS REMINDS ONE OF THE WORDS USED BY PROFESSOR KETRZYNSKI IN WRITING ABOUT BOLESLAW CHROBRY, THE FIRST POLISH KING, WHO HELD THE FIRST IMPORTANT SUMMIT MEETING IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, WITH THE EMPEROR OTTO II, AT GNIEZNO IN THE YEAR 1000. PROFESSOR KETRZYNSKI CHARACTERIZED OTTO'S EXPECTATIONS OF BOLESLAW AS UNREAL AND AS THE RESULT OF "THE INDIVIDUAL SENTIMENTS OF THE EMPEROR AND THE PERSONAL CHARM DISPLAYED BY THE POLISH RULER." BRUNO OF QUERFURT, ONE OF THE AMBASSADORS OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPEROR, "WAS DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY BOLESLAW'S CAPTIVATING PERSONALITY," AND, IN A LETTER TO HIS MASTER, OTTO'S SUCCESSOR, HENRY II, WROTE THAT BOLESLAW HAD BECOME "AS DEAR TO HIM AS HIS SOUL AND MORE THAN HIS LIFE" (THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLAND, 1950, VOLUME I, PP. 24, 26, AND 30). THE POLISH COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN LUCKY TO HAVE SO URBANE, KNOWLEDGEABLE, AND ADROIT

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3048
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMCONSUL KIEV POUCH
AMCONSUL KRAKOW POUCH
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD POUCH
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL MUNICH POUCH
AMCONSUL POZNAN POUCH
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA

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EXDIS

A SPOKESMAN DURING THIS PERIOD. IT IS NO WONDER THAT IT

WAS PRECISELY GIEREK WHO INITIATED AND HAS CONSISTENTLY STUCK TO THE "OPENING TO THE WEST." IT IS TOO SIMPLE TO SEE THIS MOVE SIMPLY AS A TURNING TO THE MOST LIKELY SOURCE FOR CREDITS. THAT, NO DOUBT, IS HOW THE MATTER IS PUT TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY THEIR POLISH COLLEAGUES. BUT THERE LURKS IN EVERY POLISH LEADER'S MIND THE BELIEF THAT THE STRONGER THE TIES OF POLAND WITH THE WEST, THE GREATER THE ROOM FOR MANEUVER WHICH IS ASSURED TO THE POLISH LEADERSHIP.

(B) "PULASKI, WE ARE HERE." ONE OF THE THINGS THAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE FIVE YEARS I HAVE BEEN HERE IS CAUSE FOR QUIET SATISFACTION AMONG POLISH-AMERICANS AND OTHER AMERICANS
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INTERESTED IN POLAND. WHEN I CAME, KAZIMIERZ PULASKI, THE KNIGHT OF THE HOKY CROSS AND CONFEDERATE OF BAR, WHO DIED CALLING ON THE NAME OF THE MOTHER OF GOD OF CZESTOCHOWA, WAS TREATED BY THIS REGIME AS "YOUR HERO, NOT OURS," AS A HIGH POLISH OFFICIAL TOLD ME IN 1973. INCREASINGLY, HE IS BEING TREATED AS "OUR COMMON HERO;" THE CULMINATION TO DATE OF HIS RECOGNITION BY THE REGIME CAME ON JULY 4, 1976, WHEN FIRST SECRETARY GIEREK REPRESENTED TO ME ON NATIONWIDE TELEVISION MODELS OF THE STATUES OF KOSCIUSZKO AND PULASKI WHICH CONSTITUTED THE POLISH PEOPLE'S GIFT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE. OF COURSE, IDEOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES STILL ARISE IN THE TREATMENT OF THIS GALLANT SOLDIER, WHO WAS PREPARED TO SMASH HIS OWN KING, IF THE KING SUBMITTED TO MOSCOW. BUT THE POPULARITY OF PULASKI AMONG POLONIA HAS DICTATED TO THE REGIME A MORE RESPECTFUL ATTITUDE. THE EFFORT TO WIN THE POLONIA, AND PARTICULARLY THAT IN THE UNITED STATES, THE LARGEST AND MOST WELL-OFF, ALSO BENEFITS FROM, AND HELPS STIMULATE FURTHER, THE RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. ALL THIS IS ONLY ONE FACET OF THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE THINKING OF THE POLISH LEADERSHIP DURING THE PAST SEVEN YEARS. THE FRG IS POLAND'S MOST IMPORTANT WESTERN ECONOMIC PARTNER; FRANCE IS POLAND'S MOST IMPORTANT FRIEND IN EUROPE ("THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY"); BUT THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE BENEVOLENT ATTITUDE OF THIS GOVERNMENT TOWARDS POLISH STRIVINGS IS REGARDED AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN, INDEED AS DETERMINING TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, THE ATTITUDES OF OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THESE IS FULL RECOGNITION OF THE DIFFERENCES,

RIFTS, AND FISSURES WITHIN THE WESTERN CAMP, AND THE REGIME
PRESS CONTINUES ROUTINELY TO REPORT "CONTRADICTIONS"
AMONG THE "CAPITALIST POWERS", BUT NOBODY PAYS MUCH
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ATTENTION TO THIS KIND OF THING ANY MORE. ON THE CONTRARY,
THE POLISH REGIME WANTS AMERICAN TROOPS TO STAY IN EUROPE
AND WANTS THE MBFR TALKS TO SUCCEED, BECUASE, FINALLY,
THE POLES WANT TO SPEND LESS ON DEFENSE, THE PRECONDITION
TO WHICH IS STABILIZATION OF THE FRG DEFENSE EFFORT AT
CURRENT LEVELS. (C) A CONFUSEE MORAL. INT THE MESSAGES
TO WHICH I REFERRED AT THAT BEGINNING OF THIS MESSAGE,
THIS MISSION HAS TAKEN WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE A REALISTIC
VIEW ON THE DESIRABLE POLICY FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN
THE FACE OF POLAND'S PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. BEFORE
WE EXTEND MAJOR NEW LINES OF CREDIT TO POLAND,
BEYOND THE \$500-MILLION IN CCC CREDITS ALREADY APPROVED
IN THIS FISCWW YEAR, WE NEED TO HAVE ASSURANCES THAT THE
LEADERSHIP WILL DO MORE THAN PAY LIP SERVICE TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF FISCAL AND ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY. THE
BEST FORM THIS COULD AKE -- AND PERHAPS THE ONLY
PRAGMATICALLY ACCEPTABLE ONE -- WOULD BE MEMBERSHIP OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. IF THAT IS THE HARDHEADED,
CAPTIALISTICALLY SOUND RESPONSE WE MUST MAKE TO
PLEAS FOR HELP FROM THE POLISH LEADERSHIP, WE NEED TO BE
CONSCIOUS AT THE SAME TIME OF THE STRIVINGS OF THE REGIME
TO PLAIT ONE STRAND OF POLAND'S DESTIMY BACK INTO THE
WESTERN POLITICAL FABRIC. THIS IS SOMETHING NEW IN POLAND'S
INTERACTION WITH THE WEST AND WE MUST BE SOPHISTICATED
ENOUGH NOT TO FRUSTRATE THE EFFORT, EVEN AS WE KEEP THE
PRESSURE ON THE REGIME TO ACT MORE RESPONSIBLY IN THE
ECONOMIC FIELD AND TO ACCORD MORE FREEDOM TO THE RESTIVE
PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY. (D) FINALLY, OF COURSE, NEITHER
THE UNITED STATES NOR ANY OTHER WESTERN STATE OR COMBINATION
OF WESTERN STATES, CAN SUCCESSFULLY ASSUME THE WHOLE BURDEN OF
LIBERATING POLANDSCROM SOVIET DOMINATION. WE CAN, HOWEVER,
JUDICIOUSLY HELP THE CURRENT, PREDOMIANTLY MODERATE
LEADERSHIP CONTINUE TO SEEK A WIDENING AND DEEPENING
OF ITS OPENING TO THE WEST. THE OPERATION IS A DELICATE ONE
BOTH FOR THE POLISH LEADERSHIP AND ITS WESTERN PARTNERS.
BUT IS IS WORTH MAKING, BECAUSE THE POLISH PEOPLE BELONG
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SPIRITUALLY, MORALLY, AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY TO THE WESTERN
WORLD, EVEN IF POLAND'S GEPGRAPHICAL POSITION ARGUES
OTHERWISE.

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